An executive went to trial. Another alleged scheme participant cooperated. Corsa Coal itself went bankrupt. Whatever executives thought the FCPA pause meant for their exposure, this case is a useful corrective — and former US Attorney Eric Olshan, who built the underlying prosecution, is in a rare position to explain exactly what happened and why compliance officers should be paying close attention.
With all gratitude to Mark Twain, reports of the death of FCPA enforcement under the Trump Administration have been greatly exaggerated. In February, a federal jury in Pennsylvania found a former coal company executive guilty of bribing Egyptian officials in connection with more than $140 million in contracts.
The conviction of Charles Hunter Hobson, formerly a vice president at Corsa Coal, came after a nine-day trial in Pittsburgh’s Western District of Pennsylvania — the same district where, years earlier, then-Assistant US Attorney Eric Olshan had built the case and obtained the 2022 indictment against Hobson.
Hobson was found guilty on seven counts: two FCPA violations, conspiracy to violate the FCPA, money laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. His sentencing has been scheduled for June 25; he faces a maximum sentence of 65 years, though his attorneys have said he will appeal the conviction.
A year earlier, President Donald Trump had signed an executive order pausing FCPA enforcement, and Hobson’s defense team immediately sought a continuance, arguing the review might lead to dismissal. The DOJ completed that review, decided to proceed and opposed a second delay attempt in December 2025. By the time opening statements began Feb. 9, the question of whether the case would survive the pause had already been answered. The jury deliberated for five hours before delivering its verdict.
The human architecture of the case is worth understanding. Hobson didn’t act alone, according to the government. Frederick Cushmore Jr., another Corsa executive, pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge back in 2021 and cooperated with authorities, and his testimony at trial was among the most damaging evidence against Hobson. Cushmore awaits sentencing, and as Olshan told CCI, the contrast between the two men’s choices will be reflected in their outcomes: “Cooperating and acknowledging wrongdoing is often far more advantageous than proceeding to trial. Cushmore’s sentence will reflect that he owned up to his conduct, did so early and provided compelling and credible testimony against Hobson.”
Corsa Coal itself, meanwhile, is now bankrupt. The company received what appeared to be favorable treatment from the DOJ in 2023, a declination with disgorgement, requiring it to pay back only $1.2 million of an estimated $33 million in profits because, the DOJ concluded, paying more would have threatened the company’s viability. But the favorable resolution did not save it: The company filed for Chapter 11 reorganization in January 2025.
As Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva put it in the DOJ’s statement announcing the conviction: “Businessmen and companies that pay bribes to foreign government officials to win contracts undermine the rule of law and distort competition, which hurts American business interests worldwide.”
That last point — harm to law-abiding competitors — is one Olshan identifies as central to understanding why this case survived the FCPA pause.
Olshan, now a litigation partner at McGuireWoods, is uniquely positioned to explain what the verdict means and what compliance professionals should take from it. His Q&A with CCI, conducted via email, is below.
CCI: You were the assistant US attorney (AUSA) who investigated Hobson and obtained the 2022 indictment — and you went on to serve as US attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania, where this nine-day trial ultimately took place. Now you’re watching the verdict come in from the private sector. How do you feel about the outcome, and what does it mean for a case that survived one of the most dramatic enforcement pivots in the FCPA’s 50-year history?
Eric Olshan: I know how much work went into investigating this case, so naturally I felt some personal investment in the outcome of the “pause” and was gratified to see that the department made the right call to continue with the prosecution. The guilty verdicts on all counts certainly vindicate that decision and reinforce that the conduct in this case matters to ordinary citizens. And while I feel some satisfaction in the outcome, it is really a testament to the dedication of the trial team from the US Attorney’s Office in Pittsburgh and the FCPA Unit at Main Justice, who worked together for years to litigate the case and then put on a compelling and straightforward case. The jury clearly had no problem with the government’s narrative.
CCI: After President Donald Trump signed the February 2025 executive order pausing FCPA enforcement, Hobson’s team immediately sought a 180-day continuance, arguing the administration’s own review might lead to dismissal. The DOJ ultimately completed its review and elected to proceed — and then “strenuously” opposed Hobson’s December 2025 attempt to delay further. What signals does the DOJ’s decision to see this case through send about what makes an FCPA prosecution “survivable” under the current administration’s enforcement priorities? Was the outcome a surprise to you?
EO: Although the department hasn’t publicized its justification for moving forward with the case, there are some hints in the public record as to what made the case “survivable” despite the absence of a nexus to cartels or transnational criminal organizations. Three stand out to me. First, both the intermediary and the foreign government official were prosecuted by Egyptian authorities, reflecting that the bribery conduct wasn’t considered “business as usual” in Egypt, a common justification for not pursuing accountability under the FCPA. Second, Hobson didn’t just funnel bribes to win coal contracts; he also skimmed off the top, taking a cut for himself and, in essence, cheating Corsa. The kickback conduct was clearly an aggravating factor. Third, and perhaps most importantly in the current enforcement environment, the jury heard that Hobson’s conduct disadvantaged other American companies seeking to do business in Egypt, something US Attorney Troy Rivetti highlighted in the press release announcing the conviction. The department has made clear that cases involving harm to law-abiding domestic companies remain a priority. Having made the decision to move ahead, the government’s commitment to seeing the case through to the end was hardly a surprise. And neither was the outcome at trial. This was a case that had several of the hallmarks of a successful white-collar prosecution: testimony from a cooperating insider, the use of coded language, a clear financial motive and a mountain of corroborating statements from the defendant himself, to name a few.
CCI: Hobson was convicted not only on two FCPA counts and conspiracy to violate the FCPA but also on money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering, as well as conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The current administration has directed the DOJ’s FCPA Unit to prioritize cases with a nexus to cartels and transnational criminal organizations, but money laundering is also a core focus. How significant is the money-laundering thread in keeping a case like this alive under a changed enforcement regime? And is there a broader lesson here for compliance professionals that conduct framed as a foreign bribery problem may carry a much longer legal tail through parallel charges?
EO: It is unclear how significant the money-laundering aspect of the case may have been in the department’s analysis, since FCPA cases often involve both FCPA charges and money-laundering offenses. It is not uncommon for defendants to route illicit bribe payments through bank accounts overseas, forming the basis for international promotional money-laundering charges. And because the FCPA itself cannot be used to charge the foreign government official, historically the department has employed the money-laundering statutes to bring cases against those officials in US courts. (The Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, FEPA, was enacted to close this gap, though it has yet to be used in a case.) Still, the department has been express in its continued focus on money-laundering conduct, and it is notable that three cases that have moved forward post-“pause” — Hobson, Berko and Zaglin — all involve money-laundering charges, while the dismissed Coburn/Schwartz case did not. As a result, the presence of money-laundering conduct will likely increase the chances that a case is charged and should serve as a lesson to compliance professionals that internal controls focused on clear tracing and documentation for foreign transactions — particularly those related to commissions — are critical.
CCI: Corsa Coal received a declination with disgorgement — paying just $1.2 million against $33 million in estimated profits — in 2023. Yet Hobson faces potential prison time. The DOJ successfully prevented Hobson from even presenting Corsa’s declination to the jury as a mitigating factor, with prosecutors arguing the corporate resolution had “no bearing on the facts of” Hobson’s conduct. What does this case illustrate about the relationship between a company’s resolution and the individual exposure of its executives? Should compliance officers be advising their leadership teams to think about those two tracks as distinct from each other?
EO: This case is another reminder that the interests of a company and its executives are not always aligned and often diverge. This is why it’s necessary in many investigations for executives to obtain their own lawyers; in-house counsel’s job is to represent the interests of the company alone. The Hobson declination letter spells this difference out, specifying that it provides no protection for any individuals, including Corsa employees. The differing paths in this case also underscore that it’s incumbent upon compliance officers to educate their leadership teams on the reality that outcomes for companies and their employees can vary depending on the particular facts of each case. The sooner they get to the bottom of what happened — and where there have been breakdowns in internal controls — the better positioned the company will be to make informed decisions about how to navigate the enforcement landscape.
CCI: This is believed to be only the 26th FCPA jury trial in the statute’s history. The overwhelming norm is plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and declinations. What does it tell us that the DOJ was willing — under the current administration, no less — to take this all the way to a nine-day jury trial? And what should corporate executives understand about the calculus of going to trial vs. cooperating in an FCPA matter?
EO: When prosecutors investigate, build and charge cases, they do so through the lens of making sure they can prove their case at trial, not assuming they will resolve it through a negotiated resolution or plea. The Justice Manual requires as much. So, the fact that the department took the case all the way to trial is simply a reflection that, notwithstanding the “pause,” this was the way things should work. Hobson could have negotiated a guilty plea, but it appears he had no interest, and trial was the only remaining route. Executives should know that cooperating and acknowledging wrongdoing is often far more advantageous than proceeding to trial, where the conviction rate in federal court is quite high, particularly in well-resourced prosecutions. Hobson exercised his right to a trial, but now the judge has a significant and damning record upon which to base a sentencing determination. Meanwhile, Cushmore’s sentence will reflect that he owned up to his conduct, did so early, and provided compelling and credible testimony against Hobson, all of which will impact the recommended sentencing range under the US sentencing guidelines and likely lead to a lower sentence.
CCI: One of the more striking aspects of this case is that even as the current administration has pulled back on corporate FCPA enforcement, it pursued and convicted an individual. Does that suggest the administration’s approach may be less a retreat from accountability than a rebalancing toward individual prosecutions and away from large corporate settlements? And if so, how should that shift the way executives think about their own exposure vs. their employer’s?
EO: There is often an ebb and flow between administrations when it comes to corporate accountability. Indeed, the Trump Administration has already announced shifts in favor of leniency toward companies. The clearest example is the deputy attorney general’s announcement March 10 of a first-of-its-kind department-wide corporate enforcement policy that establishes a presumption of a declination for companies that voluntarily disclose discovered misconduct, cooperate and timely and appropriately remediate the wrongdoing. Notably, this policy supersedes all prior policies from US attorneys’ offices and DOJ components (other than the Antitrust Division’s policy), even if those policies took a harder line on corporate culpability. The same is not true for individual accountability. The Justice Manual, which applies to all prosecutors across the entire agency, emphasizes that corporate enforcement is not a substitute for individual prosecutions. Prosecutors’ primary focus is holding people accountable — a company cannot operate without the people who run it. Executives should be aware of this evergreen priority because it is unlikely to change, regardless of how the current administration shifts its view on corporate culpability.
CCI: The Corsa Coal matter involved a third-party sales agent in Egypt, a state-owned enterprise counterparty and commissions that were being funneled as bribes, all classic red flags in the FCPA context. Yet the scheme ran from roughly 2016 to 2020 and involved more than $143 million in contracts. Are there compliance program design or third-party due diligence lessons that organizations should take from this fact pattern, particularly for companies operating in emerging markets or state-enterprise-heavy industries?
EO: Companies operating in these markets would do well to invest heavily in rigorous compliance programs and bear in mind that the FCPA’s books-and-records requirements set the baseline, not the ceiling, for compliance. Among other things, companies that are newer entrants to markets with a known history of corporate bribery should conduct more frequent audits and tracing of all commission payments. Oversight of sales personnel is also key: mandating regular training, promoting internal reporting, ensuring maximum transparency for communications between employees and overseas contacts, minimizing one-on-one relationships with agents and eliminating siloed reporting structures can likewise reduce the risk of illicit activity or help prevent it from going undetected for very long. Evasion of compliance measures by rogue employees will always be a possibility, but the harder companies make it for these employees, the more likely enforcement authorities will view the companies favorably down the road.
CCI: The FCPA pause, the Bondi memo’s cartel-and-TCO focus, the apparent drawdown of the SEC’s specialized FCPA unit — and now a notable individual conviction. How should companies think about the enforcement landscape for the rest of 2026? And for companies with international operations, how important is it to remember that the UK Bribery Act, EU frameworks and other foreign regimes remain fully operative regardless of what the DOJ does?
EO: A strong anti-corruption mindset should be at the core of any company’s culture. Full stop. The Hobson prosecution is just one recent example that the department, through partnerships between the FCPA Unit and US Attorney’s Offices, will continue to put resources into foreign bribery investigations and prosecutions, even ones brought under the prior administration and that involve an industry (coal) that the president has sought to bolster. Federal enforcement aside, at least one state attorney general (California’s) has sounded the alarm and is exploring holding companies accountable for foreign bribery under the state’s unfair competition law. Moreover, companies operating in the global economy need to be aware of their exposure under foreign jurisdictions’ anti-bribery regimes, which can reach the same conduct as the FCPA. The UK and EU, in particular, have leaned in on anti-bribery measures. Finally, executives in the C-suite and their boards need to remember that prosecutors have a long memory, and more importantly, the FCPA’s bribery provisions have a five-year statute of limitations (six years for books-and-records violations), ensuring that conduct occurring right now in 2026 can be prosecuted well into the next administration.
